How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that a term in the original theory fails to refer, but rather that a scientific hypothesis encapsulated by the further theory is mistaken.
Introduction
I defend in this paper a theory of the stability of reference of theoretical terms. I propose a version of descriptivism 1 that meets the following desiderata: a) Elimination of the posits of a theory is not too easy: it should not be the case that even the smallest change to a theory results in the elimination of the posits of the earlier theory.
b) Elimination of the posits of a theory is not too difficult: it
should not be the case that, regardless of how bad a theory is, the posits will be ineliminable, and they just turn out to be * Thanks to Frank Jackson, Fred Kroon, Jonathon McKuen-Green, Kristie Miller, Denis Robinson and an anonymous referee for the BJPS for helpful discussions of this paper.
1 Perhaps a version of causal descriptivism, though this term is sometimes understood to pick out a kind of descriptivism that involves exclusively casual descriptions. Kroon, F. (1987) . "Causal Descriptivism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 1-17.
Subsumption of Reference 2 vastly unlike we had imagined.
c) Whether or not there is stability of reference over time (whether the terms of earlier theories are eliminated) should not depend on controversial details of a theory of reference.
Each of the two principal approaches to the problem of the stability of reference of theoretical terms depends on a theory of reference. Traditionally, theoretical terms were taken to get their reference via some version of a description theory (specifically a Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis 2 (RCL) type of theory). In this case, the posits of theories refer just when the world contains entities that answer to the descriptions. But the history of science teaches us that most past theories were false. On a descriptivist account of reference we can conclude from this that the terms in these theories do not refer, and so the posits of the theory are eliminated. A kind of Kuhnian 3 incommensurability is thus established and, worse, considerations like the so-called pessimistic meta-induction 4 lead us to conclude that since our current theories are likely false, our current theoretical terms probably do not refer, and the posits of our current discourse also deserve elimination.
Simple causal theories of reference, however, seem to have the opposite problem. Since something has caused our uses of the terms of the theory, it 2 Lewis, D. (1970) . "How to define theoretical terms." Journal of Philosophy 67:
427-446.
3 Kuhn, T. S. (1962) . The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago ; London, University of Chicago Press.
4 First found in Putnam, H. (1978) . Meaning and the moral sciences. London ;
Boston, . See also Laudan, L. (1981) . "A Confutation of Convergent Realism." Philosophy of Science 48: 19-49.
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seems that our terms may end up referring even in cases where the theory is so hopeless, and the causes of our use of these terms so unlike how we imagined them, that we should surely conclude that they don't refer. There are ways of avoiding this conclusion with varieties of subtly varying causal theory, but doing this lands us in the embrace of some pressing problems raised by Stich
5
.
These subtly varying substantive causal theories of reference give us a huge range of alternative variations in the important details of the theory, with no good reason to choose between them. 6 On some of these variant causal theories the term 'P' will refer and on others it won't. Helping ourselves to a principle that P exists iff 'P' refers to P, we conclude that what governs whether P exists will be a trivial choice between equally plausible theories of reference. And in any case, even were we to adopt the description theory and accept the consequent incommensurability, the arguments for adopting it rather than the various causal theories appear to be in the wrong domain for settling ontology.
They leave to linguists and theorists of reference the job of fighting over whether or not there are black holes, neutrinos, beliefs, or whether anything has a temperature.
In this paper I argue that there is a version of descriptivism that doesn't have the ugly consequence that there are almost certainly no black holes neutrinos or beliefs. It is a version of descriptivism that is a semantic theory: a theory of how to determine the reference of terms, rather than a substantive theory of reference; a metasemantic account of what the metaphysical nature of the 5 Stich, S. P. (1996) . Deconstructing the mind. New York, Oxford University Press.
6 Stich, S. P. (1990) . 
Two theories involving 'cat'
I'll illustrate my version of descriptivism with an example culled from Naming and Necessity 10 which has somehow never become as famous as gold, water, or
Jonah and his non-existent whale. It is Kripke's discussion of cats.
Are there any cats? Well, cats are posited by a complex theory that involves 7 Papineau, D. (1996) . "Theory-Dependent Terms" Philosophy of Science 63 : 1-20 8 Kitcher, P. (1978) . "Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change"
Philosophical Review 87: 519-47., Kitcher, P. (1993) , The Advancement of Science.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Stich, S. and M. Bishop (1998) . "The Flight to Reference." Philosophy of Science 65(1): 33-49.
10 Kripke, S. (1980) . Naming and Neccessity. Oxford, .
Subsumption of Reference 5 their evolution and that of the other organisms around them. At the very least this is a story in which some ur-animals diverge into chordates, some of whom develop skulls and become Craniata, some of whom get backbones -are vertebrates -some of whom become gnathostomatic, some of whom evolve amniotic fluid as a means of sustaining young, some of whom become Sarcopterygii, some of whom develop into Synapsida, some of whom evolve into therapsid animals, some of whom become mammals, some of whom become Eutheria, some of whom become carnivores, some of whom are feliform, some of whom diverge into Feldidae, some of whom evolve into domestic cats.
11
If the theory is true, then I suppose it is a fairly plausible candidate for telling us some necessary truths about cats. I don't think we will meet cats on other planets, and part of why that is so is that we won't meet anything which is descended from the Gnasthostomatic animals, no matter how pussiform it looks.
But is the theory true? Probably not. I don't think this because I am a closet creationist, but rather because last time I checked the most up to date cladistic analyses of these matters, the details were pretty much up in the air. Some of this story is pretty controversial -the details depending on things like the relatively controversial interpretation of evidence from the mitochondrial 12S rRNA gene. 12 So the odds of its all being true don't strike me as very impressive.
11 Classification from McKenna, M. and S. Bell. (1997) .
Classification of Mammals
Above the Species Level. Columbia University Press, New York.
12 Ledje, C. and U. Arnason. (1996) . 'Phylogenetic relationships within caniform carnivores based on analyses of the mitochondrial 12S rRNA gene'
Journal of Molecular Evolution 43:641-649. ), and kept in the houses of many humans throughout time. Part of this theory mentions another theory: it says that cats are those things picked out by the true biological theory which explains the origins and nature of whatever it was that did all of these things.
So think of it this way: a level-1 theory T1 says that cats are whatever is described by some possibly unknown true theory (at level 2) that we'll call TT.
We'll call this claim A:
(A) T1 contains a term P1 ('cat') and a clause which associates with P1 whatever properties are associated with the term Pt of some true theory TT that explains the nature of what plays the T 1-role actually.
13
A general discussion of causal baptism can be found in Devitt, M. (1981) .
Designation. New York, Columbia University Press. It should be noted, though, that while in the case of 'cat' my semantic hunch is that 'cat' could not turn out to refer to demons, this is no structural part of the account I am giving. There may be many terms which have T1 level theories that have clauses which say that the terms refer to the posits of some true theory about biological natural kinds which play the rest of the T1 roles. But these clauses have no special priority that we can determine in advance of finding out what the weighting of these clauses is in individual speakers and the community. Perhaps there could be non-natural kinds that play the rest of the roles so well that they are better candidates than the animals for the reference of these terms: we discover this by determining the community's dispositions to respond to empirical information. The best test of my view that many of us use 'cat' in a way that would result in elimination should the catlike things be demons, would be to see what we said should we find this to be so.
The approach I am defending lends itself naturally to explication in terms of the matrices of so-called two-dimensional modal logic. The point is that the judgements we make about counterfactuals depend on what we take to be actually the case. Two-dimensional matrices allow us to survey systematically what sorts of counterfactual claims we will make on various different suppositions about how things actually are. So I'll now examine various claims relevant to issues of elimination by giving some two dimensional matrices. I will start by considering 'cats exist'.
Doing it with matrices
'Cats exist' In this chart T2m and T2r represent situations where the roles specified by T1 are played by mammalian entities and reptilian entities respectively. T2d is a 16 This box represents what to say about 'cats exist' at a world where the things that play the T1 role are reptiles, from the perspective of an actual world where cats are mammalian. The reason why there is a question mark in the box rather than 'F' is that we have not specified whether there are any mammalian entities of the same biological kind as the actual cats in this world where the T1 role is played by reptiles. If we assume that there are no such mammals in the T2r world then we can just write 'F' in this cell, and make similar adjustments in other cells.
17 Note: in the last row the claim is false in the T2m and T2r worlds because something satisfies T1 (mammals and reptiles respectively), but it's not cats, since to be cat you have to be what satisfies most of T1 actually, and nothing satisfies it actually when the demon world is actual. In the T2d world the claim is false because nothing satisfies T1 in that world either. taken to be actually. So in the first row, we take the actual world to be one where the mammalian theory T1 is true, and ask whether what we mean by 'cats exist' would be true if cat-impressions were counterfactually caused by reptiles or demons. In the second row we assume that actually cats are reptilian entities, and we ask whether 'cats exist' expresses a truth for us in counterfactual circumstances where the causes of cat-impressions are mammalian or demonic, and so on.
We can see there are two ways in which 'cats exist' is contingent. In one sense it is contingent because the claim is sometimes true and sometimes false when we hold worlds to be actual, and evaluate the claim in all these actual worlds. In other words, there is nothing a priori ruling out that there are no cats: discovering the demon world to be the actual would be to discover that there are no cats. This is what Jackson calls having a contingent A-intension 18 . There is another sense in which it is contingent: for some worlds considered as actual, the claim is sometimes true and sometimes false when evaluated in worlds counterfactual to that hypothesis about actuality. For instance if actually cats 18 This terminology comes from Jackson op cit. Readers will also find primary intension and 1-intension for A-intension (In Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.) and 2-intension or secondary intension for C-intension. Eliminativism is an open possibility because of the contingent A-intension:
the epistemic possibility that we are in a demon world means there is something we could find out that would mean there were no cats. The contingent C-intension in many rows tells us that there are necessary conditions for being a cat on certain assumptions about actuality. These assumptions allow us to conclude that counterfactual worlds in which these conditions do not obtain do not contain cats, even though in other rows where we assume that they don't obtain actually, their absence does not rule out the existence of cats.
But note that the discovery about actuality that would make us in fact become eliminativists about cats would be the discovery that cats were impossible. Now let's consider the claim that 'Xs are cats iff Xs play the T1 role':
Xs are cats iff Xs play the T1 role 
This table tells us about the relationship between claims about the existence of cats and the T2 theory. If the T2 theory is true, then it gives necessary conditions for being a cat (has a necessary C-intension), but otherwise has no bearing on the existence of cats.
The theory so far
So, we need to be able to account for the necessary a posteriori without assuming that the discovery of the non-obtaining of what we take to be essential properties of something necessarily results in its elimination. This is easily fixed by ruling out eliminativism using some kind of causal theory which more or less ensures that there is a referent: no discovery could be the discovery that there are no cats (or no phlogiston or no atoms The multi levels of theory approach that I advocate has the advantage that T2 -the theory that we suppose is a good theory of whatever plays a role specified in T1 -can turn out to be comprehensively false, whilst not resulting in the elimination of the terms of T1.
Note something interesting: the terms of T2 will indeed be eliminated if T2 is false. And, in ordinary discourse, it may often be the case that the very same words are used for the posits of T1 and the posits of T2. In general this is harmless. In the case of cats, biologists may use the word 'cat' in the same ways as 'Feline domesticus' (just as chemists and philosophers sometimes use 'H 2 0' in the same way as 'water') This is harmless on the working hypothesis that T2 is true, for in that case the working hypothesis is that some posit P1 of T1 can have associated with it the properties associated with P2 of T2 (and in some cases necessarily so). Under these circumstances, little practical confusion will be caused by using the same word.
Of course, this all goes pear shaped when we begin to doubt the truth of T2.
For then we are doubting that we should associate with P1 the properties Henceforth, however, I will make the simplifying assumption that the second level theory is a detailed theory that makes no reference to further theories. what is structural similarity, how much is enough and so on, but these are everyone's problems.
Approximate truth

Modes of reference
There are analogues between aspects of this account and Philip Kitcher's. 20 For
Kitcher, there might be one term -say 'phlogiston', but it can carry many modes of reference. One mode of reference will be, say, a version of the causal baptismal scheme, another will be an RCL account, and another may be a different causal baptismal account and so on.
Thus the question of whether we should be eliminativists about phlogiston is something that is more tricky and context sensitive than we might expect. For 20 In Kitcher loc cit token utterances of 'phlogiston' might be best analysed by different modes of reference. In one context it might be uttered with an RCL mode of reference-in that context it fails to refer (since the relevant RCL theory involving substances given off in combustion is false). In another context it might be uttered in a situation where some version of the causal baptismal account is right: in which case it does refer, and to oxygen. In yet another it might be uttered with a mode of reference which is some kind of hybrid: say a causal baptismal account, conditional on the cause being something given off in combustion. In this case it will not refer.
This is a nice story, which I think saves the data well. Compare with my account above: in that case someone might be using a term P1, or they might be using P2 directly. If they are using P2 directly, and T2 is false, their term does not refer. If they are using P1 it does refer (to whatever plays the role according to TT). The discovery is just that since T2 is false and there are no P2s, P1s aren't P2s after all. Structurally it's not that dissimilar to Kitcher's model. Instead of P1 and P2, he essentially has a univocal P, with at least two modes of reference, M1 and M2.
The difference between my account and his is that reference has been subsumed: it's not that there is a mode of reference -an independent metaphysical fact -that varies from utterance to utterance, it's just that what is meant by the term differs. In one case it's 'whatever caused X' in another it's 'whatever satisfies T2' and in another it's 'whatever caused X provided it satisfies some constraint'. So second order talk about reference has been replaced with first order talk about meaning 22 (in particular about Aintensions).
In general this is the strategy I endorse. Wherever it looks like an issue about 22 Meaning means many things. All I assume here is that A-intensions are part of the story about the meaning of a term, and so a difference in A-intension Papineau assumes that something like an RCL theory of reference is true.
As we have seen, a standard objection to such an approach is that any sufficiently complex RCL theory of some particular domain is unlikely to be true, so its terms are unlikely to refer. Thus we get the problem of the incommensurability of scientific theories across time arising in especially ugly forms. Papineau's idea is to incorporate analyticities into the theory by labelling parts of the theory as core components. The theory can change as much as we like, but in order to avoid elimination of the central terms all that is required is 23 Papineau, D. loc cit.
that the core of the theory is preserved.
There is a multitude of difficulties with this. Quite apart from whether the account depends on a substantive descriptive theory of reference as such, it is implausible that there are scientific theories that have just the right core components to get the analyticities that we want. Something like a Quinean holism might be right about the theory of chemistry, for example. Which bit of it is core? The parts of chemical theory that would have to be relevant to issues about eliminativism about, say, water, would be that water is what comes out of pipes and so on. Presumably no chemical discovery about the nature of that which fills our lakes and falls from the sky would make us think that there is no water. These would be discoveries that water is different in nature from how we take it to be. To eliminate water we would need to establish, for example, that in fact the impression that a clear drinkable liquid 24 has emerged from pipes and flowed in rivers and so on was all some kind of horrible illusion. But pipes, rivers and lakes aren't obviously part of the core of modern physical chemistry. Indeed on any plausible account of theory individuation, they are no part of that theory at all, let alone at its core. Pipes and rivers are not the subject matter of chemistry. So once again, the story I tell in two dimensional terms has some structural analogies to Papineau, but is different in important ways. It isn't, I think, committed to any substantive theory of reference, and it doesn't rely on the idea of a core to scientific theories: rather it relies on the interrelationship of theories.
24 A small complication: what I have said about levels applies equally to 'liquid'. The discovery that the stuff in the pipes was in some state of matter which behaves the way liquid behaves macroscopically, but is in fact not liquid in the sense defined by physical chemistry, wouldn't do for elimination.
Meaning, analyticity and verbal dispositions.
In agreement with Kitcher, I hold that what is referred to may be different from token utterance of one type to another token utterance of what looks like the same type. Different individuals may be using language differently when they use terms like 'phlogiston' or 'water' or 'belief'. They may even be co-referring, but (on Kitcher's model) via a different mode of reference, or according to my
It seems that on my account I have subsumed reference into meaning or, worse, analyticity. Rather than there being a mode of reference for some utterance which, say, makes it refer to 'whatever plays the phlogiston role in phlogiston theory and causes X' it's part of what is analytic on that occasion that this is so.
I do not intend to mount a full scale defence of some version of the analyticsynthetic distinction here. 25 But obviously something needs to be said, and best if that something goes some way to solving the problems that beset other attempts to get straight the connexion between views about meaning and views about ontology.
Here is the problem as I presented it for Kitcher: what is it that guarantees that the right theory of reference will make the reference of utterances be, at least usually, the things that we guess them to be? Do we have intuitions about the right account of reference, and then let them affect our intuitions about what is referred to, or does it work the other way around? In either case this is an uncomfortable kind of reflective equilibrium for someone who thinks of reference as a substantive metaphysical theory. 25 See chapters 1-4 of Jackson, F. op cit.
My substitute is to say that it is a difference in A-intension in each case that explains the relevant differences in reference. Why is this any better?
To answer this question we need to get to the core of what plausibly makes us say of someone that they refer to one thing rather than another. 'Phlogiston' is used in some context, and we think that in this context, it is taken to refer to oxygen. How is it possible to have opinions on the reference of a term? Not, surely, because our metaphsysoscopes tell us that some particular mode of reference is in place. Rather, I think, because there are contextual clues that the speaker on this occasion would not have been disposed to deny that there was any phlogiston (or 'any phlogiston in the sense I intended') on discovery that nothing was net given off during combustion. We think that such a person's patterns of counterfactual assertion would be best explained by hypothesizing a meaning something like <P is whatever is the most salient natural kind causally involved in combustion>. That is, we attribute to them a certain A-intension. If this involves unacceptable analyticities, then so does the whole practice of interpretation: of reading texts and listening in cases where there is more than one orthodox meaning for terms. Similarly when we think that 'phlogiston' is used in ways in which it fails to refer, we think that this is because the speaker is disposed to exhibit a pattern of assertion and practice best explained by hypothesizing a (possibly tacit) theory. In this case it might be one in which it is crucial that net matter is given off in combustion, and that phlogiston is part of that matter.
None of this is to mess with theories of reference; it is rather to interpret the utterances of the dead.
Interpreting the utterances of the dead is hard work, in particular we may never settle the matter because most of the evidence is gone forever; we cannot find out what the full pattern of counterfactual assertion or withdrawal would Subsumption of Reference 25 have been, because the worlds that would have tested them never came to be.
So 'who knows' may be a good answer because we will never find out, but this does not imply that there is, in every case, no fact of the matter.
So, what guarantees that our attributed intensions will track our guesses as to what the terms pick out? It's that the evidence we use to attribute intension to someone is part of the evidence we use to guess what their terms pick out.
Our guesses about how agents would take their terms to refer in conditions of
improved information is what we use to attribute intension, and we use this together with any extra information we have about the world to attribute reference. The A-intension we attribute is just that which makes best sense of this pattern. For all that philosophers talk about the problem of ignorance and error, there is a sense in which -to borrow a phrase from Marxism -it seems that we all allow that reference is determined in the final instance by the speaker. Someone who insists that by 'water' they intend to include any old liquid regardless of whether it is H 2 0, is thought of as wilfully speaking deviantly rather than being in error about what they mean, by all but the most hard line causal theorist (at least so long as this is not mere insistence, and is backed up by their dispositions to behave and respond). 
Theory 1 and the folk theory
What kind of a theory is the theory that governs A -intensions? Many discussions of the kinds of loose concepts that we have, which in some cases appeal to further theories by means of deference, use the term 'folk theory' to describe the loose theory. Though I have in the past often used 'folk theory' in these contexts, 26 I have avoided using the expression here for a couple of reasons. The first is just that for all I have said, there is nothing to rule out the possibility that in a certain speaker's mouth the relevant 'T1' -the theory that sets the A-intension may not be "folkish" at all. So Neils Bohr may have on some occasions used the term 'atom' with an A-intension governed by some particular holistically used scientific theory, and thus there was on that occasion no T2 that the T1 in use on that occasion pointed to. physics and folk biology. Folk biology may indeed appeal to further facts about the internal natures of things, whereas folk physics has no such slot: it is a modular system of prediction and explanation with no cognitive connexion to theories outside the module. Thus the entities of folk physics cannot be saved from elimination by appeal to a clause which allows for very surprising things to be in the extension of physical concepts if mandated by some natural science.
Thus we may be forced to be eliminativists about simultaneity, velocity and many other concepts if we are description theorists. And, worse, we do not merely have to be eliminativists about past usage, but as soon as we leave the lab and are engaged in thinking about the world in the ordinary (largely hardwired) way, it will turn out that our own physical concepts also fail to refer.
I do not intend the various T1s -level-1 theories -to be understood as folk theories in this sense. The level-1 theory is the theory that systematizes the semantic intuitions and dispositions to semantic judgement (where these differ). And these can easily be at odds with the outputs of modular systems. It may be that in doing everyday calculations about the positions of objects in space, my folk physics module uses some false theory which gets the predictions right some of the time. But there are two possibilities here. Firstly, the theory in the module may be completely buried, and I may have no access to it. If this is the case, then the module is more of an on-board calculator than a theory that governs semantics. The reference of my terms no more depends on it, than it would depend on the internal nature of a Palm device, which used a false theory of physics to make relatively useful predictions about the locations of objects.
Alternatively, the theory in the module may be to some extent extractable, by we took the LOT hypothesis to be false we might, more subtly, use 'there are no beliefs' to shock someone who didn't explicitly think that the LOT was required for beliefs, but whose dispositions we judged implicitly committed them to this. Perhaps something like this is what is going on in apparently interesting eliminative claims about various sorts of discourse. But in the absence of a sense of the interlocutor's dispositions (which might of course just be the dispositions to go with the average community or expert disposition)
there would be just no point opening our mouths. So armchair analysis is indispensable for us to communicate; but that doesn't mean it is decisive.
How can we be mistaken about our dispositions?
But what of this business about being mistaken about our own dispositions?
This begins to raise the problem of mere political change. What if I think that if there are demon fuzzballs I will judge that there are no cats, but in fact there would be a huge 'demons are puddies too' lobby, and I would be swept away by it, and use the word 'cat' of demons. It is tempting to say there should be some fact of the matter as to whether I have changed meaning, but it is hard to see what it might be.
Hard to say exactly, perhaps, but not hard to start. It is hard to calculate these things about ourselves, and even harder about others, but again it is not hard to guess, and sometimes it matters. If I consider telling you something like 'give me the book you once wrote about atoms' with the aim of getting the book, this is ill advised if my judgement is that you now take yourself to have, in the past, written a book about the non-existent entities of some false theory T400 which are not atoms. Once again, the guesses are needed to communicate. David Braddon-Mitchell
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